Legislative Alert

The White House has proposed cuts in C-130J, F-22 and JSF programs that would severely affect IAM jobs at Boeing/Lockheed Martin/UTC and numerous vendor locations. Attached are fact sheets, and affected states and locations. Please contact  your  Representatives and Senators on this matter. Tell them that America can't afford these cuts.

Impact of Terminating
C-130J and F/A-22 Production Lines

 Background:  The civilian leadership of the Department of Defense has recently decided to break a multi-year contract and terminate C-130J production in FY06 and terminate F/A-22 production in FY08, thus ending all aircraft manufacturing at the plant in Marietta, GA.

 Ignores the Warfighters’ Validated Requirements:

• Termination of C-130J production will leave the Air Force 114 aircraft short (-76%) of the required 150 aircraft.
• Strands Marine Corps in the midst of conversion to KC-130J at 33 of 51 required aircraft.

• Will require an additional $2.5B to sustain part of old fleet to meet needs.
• Leaves AF 200 F/A-22s short of requirement stated in 2001 Defense Planning Guidance
• Will put execution of the C-5 Modernization Program at high risk

 Devastating Impact to the Nation’s Aerospace Industrial Base:

• Marietta plant closes by 2010—8,000 Lockheed Martin direct jobs in Georgia
• 3,000 Lockheed Martin direct jobs in Texas
• C-130J program has 750 companies and 25,000 jobs nationwide
• F/A-22 program has 1000 companies and 40,000 jobs nationwide
• Shuts down 2 of only 6 active military aircraft production lines in the U.S.
  
   

Termination of C-130J will benefit the French Aerospace industry.

• This decision leaves only one manufacturer left in the world for tactical airlifters in this class – the Airbus 400.

·     US will have unilaterally ceded a multi-billion aircraft market, in which Americans
build the best product in the world, to the Europeans.

This is a Poor Business Case:

• Cuts the remaining multiyear procurement (MYP) aircraft purchases by 2/3 (from 39 to 12) while saving only one-third of the planned funding (FY06 thru FY08).
• Termination costs run up to one-third of the total remaining contract value.
• Saves only $26M in FY06
• C-130J termination will increase F/A-22 program costs and further reduce quantities.

 This is a Premature Decision

• Decisions made with no military analysis and in advance of upcoming Mobility Capability Study and Quadrennial Defense Review.
• Decision is not necessary now. 
  • C-130J termination yields no real savings until FY07.  The bulk of the claimed savings are after the MYP ends in FY08.
  • F/A-22 yields only $13M in savings through FY08; no real savings until FY09

 Recommendations:

• Restore C-130J Multiyear funding
• Direct DoD to request congressional authorization for a F/A-22 Multiyear contract for FY06-08 and,
• Publicly state that the requirement for F/A-22 will be carefully reviewed in the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review and the actual quantity procured could increase if warranted by QDR analysis and results.

                          Impact of Terminating C-130J Production Line

 Purpose: Identify the issues and impacts of the OSD Program Budget Decision (PBD) 753 to terminate the C-130J multiyear contract and the production line at the LM Aero Plant in Marietta, Georgia

 Discussion: OSD PBD 753

• PBD 753 Terminates the multiyear and procurement of C-130J aircraft for the AF and procures all 12 remaining USMC KC-130J aircraft in FY06 with no aircraft to follow

 MYP FY          03      04      05      06      07      08

USAF             0      4      11       10       9        8
USMC            4      0        4         4       4        4

PBD753                                      
USAF                                           0       0       0
USMC                                        12       0       0

• Terminates the FY03-08 USAF / USMC Joint Service Multiyear in FY06
• Stops the planned USAF 42 a/c multiyear buy at 15 a/c– cancels buy of remaining 27 a/c
  • Truncates USAF C-130 Modernization Roadmap:
    • Stops Roadmap at 36 a/c, approx 114 a/c short of 150 a/c requirement
    • Rhode Island, Quonset Point ANG and Pennsylvania, Harrisburg ANG short by 2 a/c each; California, Channel Island ANG unit short by 3 – 4 a/c
    • Mississippi AFREC unit short by 1 a/c

• Stops altogether the modernization of aging C-130E active duty squadrons @ Little Rock AFB, Arkansas and Pope AFB, North Carolina, Ramstein, Germany and Yokota, Japan.

• Truncates USMC KC-130 modernization Roadmap:
  • Stops modernization at 33 a/c, 18 short of USMC requirement of 51 a/c
  • Stops modernization of third aging KC-130F tanker squadron
    • USMC must continue to operate the costly to maintain and less capable squadron of 42 year old KC-Fs
    • USMC cost estimates, above operations cost, to retain the KC-F squadron @ $2.5B over the FYDP to cover service life extension and avionics modernization 

PBD Not Supported by Analysis: PBD actions precede on going DoD initiated Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), both scheduled for completion in 2005 – Why the rush to?   Both the USAF and USMC have validated C-130J modernization requirements

 Bad Business Decision:

• Terminating the C-130J multiyear is a bad business decision and bad government. 
• PBD 753 reduces the # of aircraft procured in FY06 by 2 a/c, but saves only $26M???
• Overall the PBD spends 2/3rd of the remaining multiyear program dollars (Program dollars remaining approx $3.2B) to terminate the program and to buy less than 1/3 of the remaining multiyear aircraft. 
• In other words, the Department is going to buy 12 more C-130Js for $2.2B, instead of 39 more aircraft for $3.4B.  Is that good business? 

Political Impact: Administration is going to receive a tremendous amount of political heat from Red and Blue state constituents for such a small return…approximately $1.2B savings from FY06-08. 

Recommendation: Contact the White House with request that the FY06 President’s Budget support completion of the C-130J multiyear.

Impacts to Production Line:

·        The Marietta production facility could begin job layoffs in 2006

·                    Supplier terminations should begin 2006

·                    The production line could close early 2008

·                    Production line restart cost estimates by the USAF are $600M

·                    Impacts to jobs across the board – approximately 25,000 US wide

·        Because the F/A-22 and C-130J are both built at Lockheed Martin's
Marietta, Ga., plant, an early end to both programs could mark the beginning of the end of the Marietta aircraft plant

·       Closing Marietta C-130J production line would close the only large military aircraft production plant on the east coast and the only tactical airlift production line in the US

·       Closing Marietta could open the door for future EADS A400 tactical airlifter sales to the US

  General discussion: C-130 is a national asset

• The multi-functional aircraft can perform tactical and strategic airlift, airdrops, Search and Rescue, gunship, weather recon, special operations, and tanker missions
• C-130s are and have been the backbone of DoD airlift operations worldwide

o                   Capable of operations in all quadrants of threats and missions

o                   Gulf War, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraqi, humanitarian and disaster relief

§                     First aircraft to deliver relief to Tsunami victims

• Why? Unique capabilities of large payload, range, and a rugged airframe capable of landing on nearly anywhere there is 3000’ to land on 
• C-130J has greatly enhanced performance, payload and maintenance benefits over older models
• New C-130Js cost 1/3 the price of other military airlifters
• Air Force and Marine Corps have aging fleets of 40+ year old aircraft
• C-130Js are less costly to operate and maintain

 Sales – 180 International and USG aircraft on-order, with 118 delivered

• International – 63 aircraft sold to date United Kingdom, Australia, Italy and Denmark
• USG – 117 aircraft sold to date to USAF, USMC, USCG through FY08 including the

 multiyear contract for 62 aircraft (MY1 FY03–FY08)

o      Prior to PBD 753 - Multiyear 1 savings to DoD equaled $513M or 10.9%

o      Prior to PBD 753 - Both the USAF / USMC planed a second multiyear buy

      (MY2) starting in FY08 to complete their Roadmaps 

Commercial Development Program Saves USG Dollars - Program Embraced and Fully Implemented Congressional and DOD Acquisition Reform - First Major Weapon System To Be Procured on a Commercial Item Basis

• Contractor Bore Complete Development Cost and Risk

o       Significant USG Savings - No Up-Front US Government Development Funding

o   Commercial Development Led to Large Number of Early Export Aircraft Orders

o    Export Orders Increased Production and Benefited USG w/Lower Prices

USAF / USMC  “Js to the Fight” (J2TF)

• First two USAF deployed in December; USMC first KC-Js deploy in February
• UK, Australia, Italy sent Js early on to the fight in Afghanistan and Iraq 
• C-130s airlifter of choice for combat sustainment and “flying convoy” missions in Iraq
• J2TF Combat Report - The Guard and Reserve crews flying the J in combat report they continue to be impressed with the performance of the aircraft and that they have successfully completed all missions in Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the to the Horn of Africa. Due to the increased performance of the aircraft, the missions are completed faster and at safer altitudes. In some cases the J model is capable of completing a mission in one crew duty day that would require two days in the older models of the C-130. The aircraft's larger cargo compartment and increased engine performance allows twice as much cargo weight to be carried on each mission. This translates into fewer aircraft being exposed to potential threats from insurgents, greater terrain clearance over the mountains of Afghanistan and lower operating costs for the Air Force. The accuracy of the navigation systems and integration of the Heads up Displays (HUD) exponentially increases situational awareness and the overall safety of the aircraft.

"We currently fly along side our comrades from Australia and the United Kingdom and regularly exchange experiences that will serve to improve future operations of this extremely capable aircraft. "

Why America Needs a Sufficient F/A-22 Force

·        Background: The USAF wartime requirement accepted by OSD in the 2001 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) called for 381 F/A-22s—240 combat coded F/A-22s spread over 10 Air Expeditionary Forces, plus attrition, test and training aircraft.  The PBD in the proposed FY2006 budget results in only 180 F/A-22s—less than half of the USAF requirement!

 ·        This decision results in no savings until FY09. Therefore, we urge reversal of this decision until completion of classified QDR analysis, involving uniformed military leadership, rather than presupposing the results of QDR analysis.

 ·        The Air Force will not be able to guarantee Air Superiority in the 21st Century without a sufficient quantity of F/A-22s—many developing and near-peer nations are modernizing their air forces and air defenses now!

 ·        We should proceed with the Air Force’s stated #1 combat modernization priority—our nation invested nearly $30B in R&D to develop the world’s finest Air Dominance fighter—we must buy in quantities that pay back this investment!

o       Cutting the last $11B (15%) out of the planned $72B investment eliminates the least expensive and yet most capable 100 a/c (36%) of the envisioned initial 277 a/c buy.

o       A small, token force of revolutionary F/A-22s encourages, rather than discourages, potential adversaries to invest more in airpower and advanced SAMs. The perception that a small Raptor force could be overwhelmed with numbers encourages adversary investment.

 ·        Buying only 180 F/A-22s creates another B-2 like “Low Density, High Demand” force, inadequate to meet anything other than a SINGLE small regional conflict.

o       Desert Storm, the last major integrated Air War, with over 40 allied a/c lost, used well over 200 Air Superiority F-15C and F-1 Tornado fighters—and our force size then afforded at least 300 in reserve to counter any Korean threat.

 ·        While the Air-to-Ground optimized JSF is the essential key to an affordable, persistent multi-role strike force, the future joint force solution requires sufficient numbers of both F/A-22 and JSF.  The Air Dominance optimized F/A-22 flies much higher, much faster, and has enhanced survivability and lethality against advanced Air-to-Air and Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) threats.

 ·        Previous Presidential administrations and Congresses funded future fighter modernization R&D in lieu of procurement. Now this administration has decided to terminate that long overdue modernization procurement—just as the Raptor is proving the $30B in R&D money was well spent.  Imagine developing a cure for cancer and then not buying the medicine.

·        OSD, without the benefit of strategic analysis and contrary to military advice, is killing both adequate long-term quantities and capabilities, as well as operational readiness—based on the fallacy that all future wars will be similar to the last war.

o       Future wars will most assuredly prove that Air Dominance is required, not desired.  Paying for Air Dominance without sufficient F/A-22s will cost us lost lives and aircraft.

o       OSD analysts in the late 1940’s used similar fallacious arguments to gut conventional force investment, with the rationale that future wars would be nuclear, rendering conventional air and land power unnecessary.  That strategy eroded our conventional readiness and proved deadly to over 36,000 Americans in the Korean War.

 ·        2004’s “Cope India” Exercise reinforced previous Air Force cautions that other nations now possess fighters that are at technological parity with current U.S. air superiority and multi-role aircraft.  The F/A-22 regains our 20-30 year national advantage in the air—failing to purchase adequate quantities abandons much of that advantage.

o       According to open sources:

§         Many nations are buying and even building hundreds of advanced Flanker variant fighters—equivalent or superior to the F-15!

§         Many nations are buying multiple advanced SAMs that can easily target and kill our current non-stealth fighters.

§         Non-stealth aircraft simply will not survive 2010+ SAM engagement.

o       Fighting new foreign threats in 2010 with 30 year old F-15s, F-16s, and F-18 designs relives our previous historical mistakes—

§         1941: Fighting Zeros and Me-109s in with the outclassed P-38s,  P-39s, and P-40s.  The P-51 arrived late after many fighters, bombers and pilots/crews were lost.

§         1950: Fighting the unanticipated new MiG-15 with obsolete P-51s and P-80s. The F-86 arrived late and dramatically turned the tide.

 ·        Calling the F/A-22 a “Cold War relic” is as uninformed as saying that about the HH-60 Blackhawk, M-16 rifle or Nimitz carrier.  The fact is, the overwhelming majority of modern weapons are required in war, whether that war is against a large conventional or a small unconventional adversary, in order to leverage maximum possible advantage from the air, sea and land.

o       Russian fighter exporters have claimed their next fighter will be in the JSF’s capability class—making the clearly Air Dominant F/A-22 even more essential to reasserting our national advantage in aerospace.

 ·        1120 F/A-22 suppliers in 44 states contain 40,000 jobs that are crucial to the health of the cutting edge U.S. Aerospace Industrial Base. These suppliers will earn over $44B in past and future F/A-22 revenue.